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When a Township Exercises the Power of Eminent
Domain, the Court Must Seek the True Purpose
Behind the Taking and Void the Condemnation
Where It Exceeds Statutory Authority: Middletown
Township v. Lands of Stone
PROPERTY - EMINENT DOMAIN - ABUSE OF DISCRETION - The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that Middletown Township
abused its discretion where the condemnation of a 175-acre farm
did not proceed according to careful planning and where the real
purpose for the taking violated the Open Space Lands Act.
Middletown Township v. Lands of Stone, 939 A.2d 331 (Pa. 2007).
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I. THE FACTS OF MIDDLETOWN
The Stone family owned a 175-acre farm in Bucks County.' In
1998, the Stone farm was partitioned into four separate parcels by
stipulated order.2 On September 12, 2000, the Middletown Board
655
1. Middletown Twp. v. Lands of Stone, 939 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. 2007).
2. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 333.
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of Supervisors ("Board") conducted a meeting during which they
discussed a request to approve a preliminary plan for a subdivi-
sion of the farm. 3 At this meeting, Mel Kardos, the Chairman of
the Board, stated concern about development of the smallest
tract.4 The Board continued to discuss the issue and ultimately
agreed to set aside the action until they could establish the possi-
bility of acquiring the land from the Stones.
5
Two weeks later, the Board met to discuss how to prevent the
development of the Stone farm. 6 Although the farm had already
been partitioned, Kardos moved to authorize the Township to con-
demn the whole farm. 7 The Board approved this motion.8 The
Township then approved the necessary resolution and filed a dec-
laration of taking,9 setting forth its authority to do so under the
Second Class Township Code. 10 The stated purpose was to obtain
a fee simple" interest in the Stone farm to be used for recreation
and open space purposes.
12
On the following day, Kardos spoke with the Bucks County Cou-
rier Times.' 3 During this conversation, Kardos stated that the
Township did not want to remove Joseph Stone, the current occu-
pant, from the farm and would likely permit him to continue to
use the land. 14 Kardos also stated that the Board only wanted to







7. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 333.
8. Id.
9. See 26 PA. CONS. STAT. § 302 (2006) (providing condemnation may be effected only
by the filing in court of a declaration of taking).
10. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 333. The Second Class Township Code provides:
The board of supervisors may designate lands or buildings owned, leased or con-
trolled by the township for use as parks, playgrounds, playfields, gymnasiums,
swimming pools, indoor recreation centers, public parks and other recreation areas
and facilities and acquire lands or buildings by lease, gift, devise, purchase or by the
exercise of the right of eminent domain for recreational purposes and construct and
equip facilities for recreational purposes.
53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 67201 (2008).
11. Fee simple means "an interest in land that, being the broadest property interest
allowed by law, endures until the current holder dies without heirs." BLAcK's LAW
DICTIONARY 630 (8th ed. 2004).
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II. THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF MIDDLETOWN
On November 8, 2000, Joseph Stone filed preliminary objec-
tions 16 to the declaration of taking in the Bucks County Court of
Common Pleas.17 In his objections, Stone argued that the Open
Space Lands Act 18 expressly prohibited the Township from con-
demning the Stone farm for the purpose of preserving open
space. 19 Stone further argued that Middletown Township's use of
eminent domain was not made proper simply because the Town-
ship purported to take the farm for recreational purposes under
the Second Class Township Code and not the Lands Act.20
The trial court found in favor of Middletown Township, holding
that the Township Code did in fact grant a second-class township
the legal authority to exercise the power of eminent domain for
recreational purposes despite the express prohibitions of the
Lands Act.2' The court further held that, as to the facts of this
case, Middletown Township's true purpose for the taking was rec-
reational in nature; thus, the condemnation was proper.22 In so
holding, the court stated that it had relied on certain factual con-
clusions: (1) the Township had a long-range plan to acquire the
Stone farm, along with other properties, for recreational purposes;
(2) the Township had considered various options for the use of the
property, which included Stone's continued farming of a portion of
the land, developing passive recreational uses for the remainder,
and re-instituting a Celebration of Lights ceremony; and (3) even
though the Township's condemnation would result in the preser-
vation of open space, it still could not be invalidated where it was
16. Eminent domain issues not raised in preliminary objections are waived. In re Con-
demnation of Land for the South East Cent. Bus. Dist., 946 A.2d 1143, 1149 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2008).
17. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 333.
18. The Open Space Lands Act, 32 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5001, allows a local government
unit to acquire by condemnation an interest in real property situated within its boundaries
for purposes related to the conservation of land including efficient development, recreation
and the preservation of open space. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 335. The Lands Act does,
however, provide the following restriction: "Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection
(a) or section 5(c), local government units other than counties or county authorities may not
exercise the power of eminent domain in carrying out the provisions of this act." 32 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 5008(b) (2008).
19. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 333.
20. Id. at 333-34.




also taken properly under the Township Code for recreational
purposes. 23
Stone appealed to the Commonwealth Court, where he again
argued that the Township's stated purpose of recreational use was
mere pretext for a prohibited purpose: the preservation of the
land and prevention of development. 24 Relying on the testimony of
two Township witnesses, the Commonwealth Court upheld the
decision of the trial court, holding that a public park is an appro-
priate recreational use and that the evidence sustained the finding
that Middletown Township condemned the land for recreational
purposes. 25 The Commonwealth Court also asserted that the re-
strictions on eminent domain under the Open Space Lands Act
were not applicable here because the Township had also purported
to take for recreational purposes under the Second Class Town-
ship Code.
26
Stone then appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which
granted the appeal to decide whether the Commonwealth Court
had erred in affirming the court of common pleas' decision to over-
rule Stone's objections.27 The Supreme Court also requested that
both sides address the legal question of whether the Township had
the authority to condemn property for recreational purposes under
the Second Class Township Code where the condemnation would,
at the same time, violate restrictions set forth in the Lands Act on
the use of eminent domain by Townships for open space pur-
poses. 28
23. Id. Notably, the trial court conducted no hearing. Id. Instead, the Bucks County
Court of Common Pleas relied solely on the existing record, including depositions taken of
the board members. Id.
24. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 334.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 334-35.
27. Id. at 335. Stone's argument to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was threefold: (1)
"the Township did not have the authority to take the farm, even though it ostensibly prem-
ised the taking on authority of the Township Code, because the true purpose of the taking
was to prevent development and to conserve open spaces," (2) "while a second-class town-
ship has the power to condemn for recreational purposes under the Township Code, Middle-
town Township overstepped this authority and condemned the farm without any recrea-
tional plan for the property," and (3) the Township has "continuously stressed the impor-
tance of allowing Stone to continue to privately farm the property after it has been con-
demned, which is clearly a private venture and not a public purpose permitted by law." Id.
at 336.
28. Id. at 335.
658 Vol. 47
Summer 2009 Middletown Twp. v. Lands of Stone
III. THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT OPINIONS IN MIDDLE-
TOWN
A. Chief Justice Cappy's Majority Opinion
Chief Justice. Cappy delivered the majority opinion for the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 29 First, the Court resolved the is-
sue surrounding the conflict between the Township Code and the
Lands Act. 30 The majority agreed with the lower courts and held
that, as a matter of law, a second-class township does possess the
power to condemn property for recreational purposes under the
Township Code, even with the restrictions contained in the Lands
Act. 31 The Court found that this issue was a question of statutory
construction and, after setting forth the pertinent language of the
two statutes, looked to the rules promulgated by the Statutory
Construction Act 32 in order to reconcile the dispute. 33 The major-
ity first stated that, under the Act, the Court was required to "as-
certain and effect" the intent of the legislature conveyed by their
precise statutory language.34 The majority then stated that when
the words of a statute are free from ambiguity, the letter of the
law should not be overlooked in pursuit of the spirit of the law.
35
The Court declared that the language of both statutes was clear
and that there was no conflict. 36 The Township Code permits sec-
ond-class townships to take land for recreational uses.37 The
Lands Act restricts second-class townships from taking land in
order to preserve it as open space. 38 However, the Court asserted
that the fact the Lands Act did not empower Middletown Town-
ship to condemn property for preservation purposes did not also
mean that the Township was prevented from taking the land for
recreational purposes through the invocation of a separate act,
such as the Township Code.39 The Court reasoned that the re-
29. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 333. Justice Castille joined Chief Chief Justice Cappy's
opinion. Id. Justice Saylor filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Baldwin joined. Id.
at 340 (Saylor, J., concurring). Justice Baer filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 340 (Baer, J.,
concurring). Justice Eakin filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 342 (Eakin, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 337.
31. Id.
32. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1921 (1997).
33. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 337.
34. Id. (citing 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1921(a)).
35. Id. at 337 (citing 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1921(b)).
36. Id.
37. Id.




strictions meant only that Middletown Township could not rely on
the Lands Act to condemn the farm for open space purposes. 40
Despite its agreement with the lower courts on the first issue of
statutory construction, the majority went on to hold that the
Commonwealth Court had still erred in affirming the trial court's
decision to overrule Stone's objections.41 The Court declared that
the Township's assertion that it had taken the property for recrea-
tional purposes was pretextual.42 Leaving the factual findings of
the trial court undisturbed, the majority instead held that the
facts supported a different conclusion, namely that the true pur-
pose for taking the Stone farm was the preservation of open space
and prevention of development. 43 Thus, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court held that the Township exceeded its statutory grant
of power to exercise eminent domain.
44
In his opinion, Chief Justice Cappy first noted an earlier ruling
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Winger v. Aires45 and
stressed that the exercise of the right of eminent domain is always
in derogation of a private right and that the authority must be
strictly construed. 46 Thus, what is not granted cannot be exer-
cised.47 Chief Justice Cappy then noted that, under the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 48 all grants of eminent domain
power are limited to condemnations for public use, where the pub-
lic is to be the principal beneficiary of the taking.49 Furthermore,
the Second Class Township Code limited a second-class township's
statutory grant of power to taking for recreational purposes. 50
Therefore, the Court noted, a second-class township's only author-
40. Id.
41. Id. at 340.
42. Id. at 338.
43. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 338.
44. Id. at 339.
45. 89 A.2d 521 (Pa. 1952). In Winger, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the
School District of the Borough of Ephrata's condemnation of a 55-acre farm constituted an
abuse of discretion where the evidence established that no definite plan had been formu-
lated for the use of the land and where the taking was in excess of the School District's
needs. Winger, 89 A.2d at 521.
46. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 337.
47. Id.
48. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States provides "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
49. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 337 (citing In re Bruce Ave., 266 A.2d 96 (Pa. 1970)). In In
Re Bruce Ave., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated "a taking will be seen as having a
public purpose only where the public is to be the primary and paramount beneficiary of its
exercise." In re Bruce Ave., 266 A.2d at 99.
50. Middletown. 939 A.2d at 339.
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ized public purpose is recreation. 51 A condemnation of private
property for any other reason by a second-class township would be
void ab initio.52
In considering whether Middletown Township had properly in-
voked a recreational purpose, Chief Justice Cappy examined Be-
lovsky v. Redevelopment Authority53 and stressed that the ruling
in Belovsky imposed an obligation on the Court to seek the "real or
fundamental" purpose behind the Township's taking and not to
merely accept the stated motivation.54 It was not sufficient, the
Court held, that only part of the record demonstrated recreational
usage of the property.5 5 Instead, the Court stated that the recrea-
tional purpose must have been the true purpose for the taking.56
To ensure that the requisite public purpose was in place, Chief
Justice Cappy asserted that the Court must look to the evidence
tending to establish whether a carefully considered plan had first
been formed.57 Recalling the case of In re Condemnation by the
School District of Pittsburgh,58 Chief Justice Cappy agreed that
property may only be validly taken after "a suitable investigation
leading to an intelligent, informed judgment" by the condemning
authority. 59  Furthermore, according to Pidstawski v. South
Whitehall Township,60 a Township's taking would be upheld only
where the record first demonstrated that it was "carefully planned
and painstakingly thought out with a view toward present and
future requirements."61 Chief Justice Cappy also looked to the
seminal United States Supreme Court case of Kelo v. City of New
London,62 in which the Supreme Court relied heavily upon the
existence of a "carefully considered" development plan to support a
ruling that the condemnation of residential property was not pre-
textual. 63 Additionally, Chief Justice Cappy held that, as decided
51. Id. at 337-38.
52. Id. Ab initio: "From the beginning." BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 4 (8th ed. 2004).
53. 54 A.2d 277 (Pa. 1947).
54. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 337-38 (quoting Belovsky, 54 A.2d at 283).
55. Id. at 338.
56. Id. at 337-38.
57. Id. at 338.
58. 244 A.2d 42 (Pa. 1968).
59. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 338 (quoting Sch. Dist. of Pittsburgh, 244 A.2d at 46).
60. 380 A.2d 1322 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977).
61. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 338 (quoting Pidstawski, 380 A.2d at 1324).
62. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). In Kelo, the United States Supreme Court held that a city may
condemn private property for economic development under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment so long as it does so as part of a clear development plan intended to benefit the
public. Id.
63. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 338.
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in the case of Winger, a plan must be adapted to meet the actual
purpose behind the taking; otherwise, it is excessive and must be
overturned.
64
Accepting the factual findings made by the trial court, the ma-
jority concluded that these findings did not support the conclusion
that the "true purpose" of the condemnation was recreational
use.65 First, Chief Justice Cappy noted that the evidence of record
did not substantially support the trial court's conclusion that the
long-range goal of the Township's Recreation, Parks and Open
Space Plan was to acquire the Stone property for recreational
use.6 6 To the contrary, the plan discussed the Stone farm only in
relation to its open space value.67 The maintenance and upgrade
of recreational facilities was contemplated only for existing parks
and facilities. 68
Second, Chief Justice Cappy examined the various options of-
fered by the Township for the use of the Stone property.69 The
first option put forward by the Township was to allow Joseph
Stone to continue to farm the land.70 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court asserted that this, however, would violate the public pur-
pose requirement of the Takings Clause and invalidate the tak-
ing.71 To condemn the land so that Joseph Stone could personally
benefit from it would serve a purely private purpose. 72
The next option the Court observed was to use the property as
an alternative entrance to a Celebration of Lights festival that the
Township would hold in an adjacent park.73 The majority ruled,
however, that this use was unconstitutionally excessive. 74 The
Court noted that the Township was limited to condemning only
the land necessary to further its planned purpose.7 5 Indeed, 175
acres would be excessive where the only purpose of the taking was
to construct another entrance to an adjacent park for a town cele-
bration that the Board had not even approved.7 6
64. Id. (citing Winger, 89 A.2d at 523).
65. Id. at 338.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 339.
68. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 338-39.




73. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 339.
74. Id. (citing Winger, 89 A.2d at 523).
75. Id. at 339.
76. Id. at 339. The Board of Supervisors testified that they would utilize a part of the
Stone Farm to provide an alternative entrance to a Celebration of Lights festival that was
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The final option was for the Township to potentially develop
recreational facilities on the remainder of the land."7 The record,
however, did not reflect that the Township had even considered
such a plan.28 Instead, the Court found that the record demon-
strated that the Board of Supervisors had not considered the
Stone farm until a public meeting was held after a court order had
partitioned the land into four parcels.7 9 Furthermore, the Board
voted to condemn the property only two weeks after discussing
their concerns that the smallest parcel would be developed. 80
Then, there was the fact that Kardos had spoken to the Bucks
County Courier Times.8' Tellingly, he had stated that "although
Mr. Stone would be free to continue farming the land, the Town-
ship wanted to acquire the farm to preserve it as open space in
order to prevent its development."8 2 These facts made the Town-
ship's true intentions clear to the Court.8 3 The majority concluded
that the purpose of the taking was for preservation of open
space. 8
4
Accordingly, the majority held that the record could not sustain
any finding that the Township had proceeded according to, either,
an intelligent, informed judgment or a firm plan to use the Stone
property for recreational purposes.8 5 The trial court therefore
abused its discretion, and the Commonwealth Court had erred in
affirming the decision. 86 The Court reversed the order of the
Commonwealth Court, remanding the case to the Bucks County
Court of Common Pleas for further proceedings.
87
B. Justice Saylor's Concurrence
Justice Saylor, joined by Justice Baldwin, concurred with the
majority, with one minor distinction. 88 Justice Saylor did not con-
sider the majority's finding that the Township's taking was for
previously held in a neighboring park in the event that they chose to resurrect the festival.
Id. (emphasis added).
77. Id.










88. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 339. (Saylor, J., concurring).
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recreational purposes as a pure conclusion of law.8 9 Instead, he
would have held that there was a significant factual element,
which transformed the issue into a mixed question of law and
fact.90 He was, nonetheless, in full support of the majority's pri-
mary holding that the record did not support the trial court's con-
clusion that the taking was for recreational purposes. 91
C. Justice Baer's Concurrence
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Baer agreed with the
majority that the Commonwealth Court had erred.92 However,
Justice Baer asserted that the majority had based its opinion on
the factual record, while his own was based on the conflict be-
tween the Second Class Township Code and the Open Space
Lands Act. 93 Observing that statutes relating to the same thing or
the same class of things must be construed in pari materia,94 he
concluded that Middletown Township's power to acquire land un-
der the Township Code applied only to takings "outside the ambit
of the Open Space Lands Act. '95 Here, the Township Code permit-
ted the Township to condemn property for recreational purposes,
while the Lands Act prohibited the Township from condemning
land for open space purposes.96 While it was obvious that the
statutes did not always apply to the same class of property, Jus-
tice Baer reasoned that, in the present case, there was clearly an
overlap where the Township's own Declaration of Taking stated
89. Id. Note, however, that the majority also did not regard this finding as a pure
conclusion of law. Specifically, the majority stated that "in our limited grant we asked
whether the Commonwealth Court erred in affirming the Court of Common Pleas in over-
ruling the preliminary objections to the declaration of taking. For this issue, our standard
of review is abuse of discretion." Id. at 613.
90. Id. at 340. With regard to mixed questions of law and fact, the court reviews the
whole record. Where factual findings are at issue, the court will accept the trial court's
conclusions to the extent that the record supports them. Where a legal question is at issue,
the trial court's determinations will be given no deference at all and will instead be re-
viewed de novo. In re Condemnation by Urban Redevelopment Auth. of Pittsburgh, 913 A.2d 178,
183 (Pa. 2006).
91. Id.
92. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 340. (Baer, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 340-41.
94. The Pennsylvania rules of statutory construction at 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1932 in-
form the court as follows:
(a) Statutes or parts of statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same
persons or things or to the same class of persons or things.
(b) Statutes in pari materia shall be construed together, if possible, as one statute.
95. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 341.
96. Id.
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that "[t]he purpose of the condemnation is to acquire a fee simple
interest to the [Farm] for recreation and open space purposes."
97
Since the language of both statutes was invoked in the Town-
ship's taking, Justice Baer stated that the majority should have
attempted to construe both as one unified statute and give effect
to all of the provisions.98 Justice Baer stressed that the Township
Code's authorization for taking land for recreational purposes
could only apply where the restrictions set forth under the Open
Space Lands Act was not applicable. 99 This was because the rules
of statutory construction called for a narrow interpretation of the
phrase "recreational purposes" under a statute such as the Town-
ship Code that granted eminent domain power.100
Accordingly, Justice Baer found that the phrase, as it applied in
the present case, should have been defined in opposition to the
provision of the Lands Act forbidding second-class townships from
"exercising the power of eminent domain"' in carrying out the pro-
visions of the Act.1 1 In attempting to reconcile the two, 10 2 Justice
Baer asserted that the phrase, as it appeared in the Township
Code, was a subpart of broader recreational purposes that did not
overlap with the prohibited purposes of the Lands Act. 0 3 For this
reason, Justice Baer concurred with the majority's decision, but
would have concluded that the lower court erred in applying the
Second Class Township Code.
104
D. Justice Eakin's Dissent
Justice Eakin dissented. 0 5 He reasoned that it was not for the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to determine whether it would have
reached the same factual conclusions as the trial court. 0 6 In his
dissent, he asserted that, if the record supported the lower court's
findings of fact when the majority had accepted abuse of discretion
as the proper standard of review, the lower court's decision should
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 342.
99. Id.
100. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 342.
101. Id.
102. Note, however, that the rule stating that laws in pari materia should be read to-
gether is applicable only if the words of the statutes are ambiguous; otherwise, the statutes
are presumed to have different constructions. In re McFarland's Estate, 105 A.2d 92, 96 (Pa.
1954).
103. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 342.
104. Id.
105. Id. (Eakin, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 343.
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not be disturbed.10 7 Furthermore, Stone, as a condemnee, had an
exceptionally heavy burden of proving that the trial court had
abused its discretion. 108
Justice Eakin opined that the facts relied upon by the trial court
were sufficiently established and that Stone had failed to meet his
burden. 10 9 In particular, he focused on two witnesses who testified
that the farm would have been used as an extension of an existing
public park and that it had been included in the Township's long-
term Recreation, Parks, and Open Space Plan.1 0 Consequently,
Justice Eakin would have held that these facts supported the con-
clusion that the central purpose of the condemnation was recrea-
tional and would have affirmed the Commonwealth Court's deci-
sion."'
IV. THE PRECEDENT LEADING TO MIDDLETOWN
Well before the nineteenth century, the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania and its forerunner, the Colony of Pennsylvania, util-
ized the power of eminent domain." 2 In the early Appeal of
Lance,11 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged the
common law principle that the power of eminent domain was an
essential attribute of the Commonwealth's sovereignty." 4 In later
decisions, the Court explained this principal further, holding that
the power of eminent domain is not a power vested in the Com-
monwealth by any constitution or statute. 115 Rather, the United
States and Pennsylvania Constitutions regulate the use of the
power.116
107. Id.
108. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 343 (citing Sch. Dist. of Pittsburgh, 244 A.2d at 46).
109. Id. at 343.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. In re Legislative Route 1018, Section 4, Lower Chichester Twp., Delaware County,
222 A.2d 906, 909 (Pa. 1966).
113. 55 Pa. 16 (1867).
114. Id.
115. Phila. Clay Co. v. York Clay Co., 88 A. 487, 488 (Pa. 1913) (citing Jacobs v. Clearview
Water Supply Co., 69 A. 870, (Pa. 1908)).
116. Id. Under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the government can con-
demn property only if it is taken for public use with payment of just compensation. Kelo, 45
U.S. at 520 n.27. Similarly, under Article 1, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,
private property cannot be taken and applied to public use without authority of public law
and just compensation or the provision of security. See, e.g., Winger, 89 A.2d 521 (Pa. 1952)
(applying the restraints of article 1, section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution).
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Throughout the nineteenth century, the use of eminent domain
was infrequent and uncontroversial. 1 7 During this time, courts
would only permit condemnation where the land was to be occu-
pied by members of the public. 1 8 However, during the twentieth
century, states began making efforts to extend this power for new
purposes such as urban renewal and commercial development." 9
Despite challenges by the landowners, courts consistently upheld
the takings as proper public uses.
120
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has always held that the
power of eminent domain arises only when a legislative enactment
has set forth the specific "occasions, modes, and agencies" for its
exercise. 121 Consequently, local legislative bodies cannot exercise
the power except where it has been delegated for a specific pur-
pose through an enabling statute.
122
Despite the need for enabling legislation, when a local legisla-
tive authority has authorized a condemnation of private property,
there has been a longstanding policy of deference to the legislative
decision. 123 As a result, a legal presumption has arisen that legis-
lative bodies exercise the power in the public interest and that
their decisions have been reached properly. 24 The courts have
permitted this presumption to be overcome only where the record
shows an abuse of discretion, fraud, or bad faith.125 Time and
again, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the burden
of rebutting this presumption is a "heavy burden."' 26
117. JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 658 (Matthew Bender &
Company, Inc. 2007). The exercise of eminent domain was usually limited to purely public,
governmental functions such as roads, schools and post offices. Id. at 658.
118. Id. at 661.
119. Id. at 661.
120. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (holding that public use is defined
by the purpose of the government's taking and not the identity of the future occupants); See
also Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (holding that the public use require-
ment is coterminous with the police power of a state).
121. Legislative Route 1018, 222 A.2d at 908.
122. Appeal of White Oak Borough Auth., 93 A.2d 437, 438 (Pa. 1953). The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court stated: "Neither Authorities nor Municipalities are sovereigns; they
have no original or inherent or fundamental powers of sovereignty or of legislation; they
have only the power and authority granted them by enabling statutory legislation." Id. at
438. In the case of Middletown, the enabling statute was the Second Class Township Code
found at 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 67201 (2008), which allows second-class townships to take
land for recreational purposes.
123. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480, 488-89.
124. Winger, 89 A.2d at 523.
125. Pidstawski, 380 A.2d at 1324 (citing Truitt v. Borough of Ambridge Water Auth.,
133 A.2d 797 (Pa. 1957)).
126. Id. (citing Sch. Dist. of Pittsburgh, 244 A.2d 42 (Pa. 1968)).
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A. Winger and Belovsky
In 1952, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Winger v. Ai-
res127 that property owners had met their burden of proving
abuse. 128 In Winger, the School Board of the Borough of Ephrata
condemned nearly fifty-five acres of farmland to build a school
that would accommodate only sixty-five students. 29 Writing for
the majority, Justice Musmanno acknowledged that a presump-
tion existed that the school board had acted properly. 30 The
Court found, however, the board's conduct clearly rebutted the
presumption that its decisions had been reached through "intelli-
gent judgment" or "in a legal manner after suitable investiga-
tion."131
In so holding, Justice Musmanno focused heavily on the fact
that no plan was formulated to determine the use, location, cost,
or physical specifications of the school. 132 Furthermore, no archi-
tects had been hired, and no surveys had been taken. 33 In addi-
tion, the school board condemned more land than was required to
fulfill the purpose of the taking,' 34 and it did so under the false
assumption that it could sell the excess land.
135
The majority pointed to the prohibition in the Pennsylvania
Constitution against taking property without the authority of
law. 136 The Court held that the taking of property in order to re-
sell it was the equivalent to entering the real estate business and
exceeded the school board's statutory authority to condemn land
for school purposes. 37 To support this, Justice Musmanno relied
upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. City of Philadelphia.138 There, the
Court held that an Act of the General Assembly authorizing the
127. 89 A.2d 521 (Pa. 1952). The Middletown Court relied on the holding in Winger that
a plan must be tailored to the actual purpose or else be overturned as excessive. Middle-
town, 939 A.2d at 338.
128. Winger, 89 A.2d at 523.
129. Id. at 522. The School Board of Ephrata had relied on the statutory authority
granted under the Public School Code of 1949 found at 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7-703 (1992).
Id.
130. Id. at 523.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 522.
133. Winger, 89 A.2d at 522.
134. Id. at 523.
135. Id. at 522-24.
136. Id. at 522.
137. Id. at 522-24.
138. 88 A. 904 (Pa. 1913).
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City of Philadelphia to condemn land and resell it to a private
party was unconstitutional because it lacked a valid public pur-
pose. 139
Two years after Winger, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court de-
cided Belovsky v. Redevelopment Authority.140 In Belovsky, a tax-
payer in the city of Philadelphia filed a constitutional challenge to
the condemnation of his property under the Urban Redevelopment
Law ("URL"), which authorized private insurance companies to
purchase and lease condemned properties through redevelopment
projects aimed at restoring blighted Philadelphia communities.
14 1
In his challenge, Belovsky, the taxpayer, argued that the law was
unconstitutional because it violated the public purpose clause by
authorizing the transfer of property from one private landowner to
another. 142
The Court disagreed with Belovsky and held that the law was
constitutional. 143 In so holding, the Court asserted that the law
requires that property be condemned only where it is reasonably
required to fulfill the purpose for which the property was taken.
144
The Court then noted that, during such constitutional challenges,
the Court's obligation was to examine the real and fundamental
purpose of the law. 145 Here, the Court held that the real purpose
of the URL was the rehabilitation of blighted communities.
146
That being the case, the Court found that long-term ownership of
the condemned properties was not required to remove blight and
might even exceed the authority granted under the URL where
the statute did not authorize long-term ownership by the state. 147
In fact, the Court doubted that any statute authorizing the use of
eminent domain could have as its sole purpose the transfer of
property to other private individuals. 48 Thus, the statute was
constitutional where the fundamental purpose provided a benefit
to the public,149 in this case the elimination of blight,150 even
139. Pa. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 88 A. at 908.
140. 54 A.2d 277 (Pa. 1947).
141. Belovsky, 54 A.2d at 279-81.
142. Id. at 281.
143. Id. at 285.
144. Id. at 283.
145. Id. at 282-83.
146. Belovsky, 54 A.2d at 282.
147. Id. at 283. The law requires that property be taken by eminent domain only to the
extent required for the purpose for which the power is exercised. Id.
148. Id. at 283.
149. Going further than the constitutional challenges presented in Belovsky, the court in
In re City of Scranton, 572 A.2d 250 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990), added that private gain is
actually immaterial to the question of public purpose for takings made pursuant to the
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though the transfer portion, standing alone, might have been
unlawful. 151
While Winger and Belovsky dealt with the transfer of private
property to other private parties, 152 the case of In re Condemna-
tion by the School District of Pittsburgh53 concerned a transfer of
private property to a public entity. 54 In the latter case, a group of
landowners objected to the taking of their property by the Board of
Public Education for the development of school parking facili-
ties. 1 5 Depositions revealed that, at the time of the taking, no
plans had been drawn for any building and that all long-range
plans were still in the "conversational" stage. 56 The property
Urban Redevelopment Law. Id. at 254. There, the court held that a taking does not "lose
its public character merely because there may exist in the operation some feature of private
gain, for if the public good is enhanced it is immaterial that a private interest also may be
benefited." Id. (quoting Belovsky, 54 A.2d at 283). Thus, once the court found that there
was evidence to support a finding of blight and that the development plan's purpose was to
remove the blight, any further examination regarding the existence of a public purpose was
unnecessary. Id. at 254.
150. Section 9 of the Urban Redevelopment Law authorizes condemnation by a Redevel-
opment Authority of blighted properties within a properly certified redevelopment area for
the purpose of eliminating the blight. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1709 (2008). Section 3 of the
URL defines "redevelopment area" as "any area, whether improved or unimproved, which a
planning commission may find to be blighted because of the existence of the conditions
enumerated in section two...." 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1703(n). Historically, Section 2 pro-
vided that an area may "become blighted because of the unsafe, unsanitary, inadequate or
over-crowded condition of the dwellings therein, or because of inadequate planning of the
area, or excessive land coverage by the buildings thereon, or the lack of proper light and air
and open space, or because of the defective design and arrangement of the buildings
thereon, or faulty street or lot layout, or economically or socially undesirable land uses." 35
PA. CONS. STAT. § 1702(a). However, in 2006, the Property Rights Protection Act ("PRPA")
repealed these highly subjective criteria, limiting blight to characteristics based on the
physical condition of the property. 26 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 201-206 (2006). As a result, it is
now more difficult to certify an area as blighted.
Section 10 establishes the demand for certification of an area and sets forth the
requisite process for the preparation and adoption of a redevelopment plan. In In re Con-
demnation by the Urban Redev. Auth. of Pittsburgh, 594 A.2d 1375, 1380 (Pa. 1991), the
Supreme Court neatly summarized the Section 10 process as follows: 1) designation of the
blighted areas in need of redevelopment; 2) preparation of detailed proposals for the rede-
velopment, 35 PA. STAT. § 1710(a)-(c); 3) submission of the proposals to the planning com-
mission for recommendations, 35 PA. STAT. § 1710(e); and 4) submission of the proposals
and planning commission recommendations to the governing body for approval. However,
before deciding to approve or reject the proposal, the governing body is required to hold
public hearings on the redevelopment proposal and give notice of such hearings by newspa-
per publication, 35 PA. STAT. § 1710(g).
151. See Belovsky, 54 A.2d 277 (Pa. 1947). The Middletown Court relied on the holding
in Belovsky to justify scrutiny of the true purpose behind the Township's taking. Middle-
town, 939 A.2d at 337-38.
152. Winger, 89 A.2d 521 (Pa. 1952); Belovsky, 54 A.2d 277 (Pa. 1947).
153. 244 A.2d 42 (Pa. 1968).
154. Sch. Dist. of Pittsburgh, 244 A.2d at 43.
155. Id. at 46.
156. Id. at 43.
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owners contended that the condemnation was arbitrary and capri-
cious. 157 Making no formal ruling on the charge of arbitrariness,
the lower court upheld the objections on the sole basis that the
acquisition of land for school parking was for a public purpose. 158
As in Winger, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the
primary question surrounding the charge of arbitrariness was
whether the Board had exercised intelligent judgment and con-
ducted a suitable investigation. 59 Here, however, no evidence had
been taken by the trial court on the issues of fact raised by the
property owners' preliminary objections. 60  The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that this was a failure by the lower court to
promptly determine preliminary objections in an eminent domain
challenge.' 6' Nevertheless, the Court held that the record could
not satisfy the landowner's heavy burden.162 Thus, the taking was
upheld. 1
63
In 1977, in the case of Pidstawski, landowners objected to the
Township of South Whitehall's condemnation of their land on the
basis that the taking was for future development of a recreational
facility. 64 Looking again for evidence showing the existence of in-
telligent judgment, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that it
would not second-guess the Township, which had carefully
planned the project for many years and had conducted detailed
studies about the acreage and locations. 65
B. Kelo v. City of New London
In more recent years, the United State Supreme Court gathered
national attention on this issue in Kelo v. City of New London.166
New London, Connecticut was a depressed city with low tax reve-
nues and high unemployment. 16 7 To revitalize the area and en-
courage access to the waterfront, New London adopted a compre-
hensive plan to condemn local properties and create a develop-
157. Id. at 46.
158. Id.





164. Pidstawski, 380 A.2d at 1323.
165. Id. at 1324.
166. Alexandra B. Mass, The Frontier of Eminent Domain, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 651, 652
(2008); see Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
167. Id. at 473.
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ment that would complement the planned research center of the
Pfizer Corporation. 168 Along with other homeowners, Susette Kelo
objected to the taking, contending that it was not for public use
and that her property was in fine condition and not blighted.
169
The Court disagreed with the homeowners, and held that a city
can condemn residential property and convey it to a private com-
pany as part of an economic redevelopment plan.
70
Relying on the Court's holdings in Berman v. Parker17' and Ha-
waii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,172 Justice Stevens, writing for
the majority, concluded that three observations supported the
holding that the City's private development plan served a public
use. 173 First, the City's underlying purpose was to promote sig-
nificant municipal development, which would create more jobs and
generate more revenues. 174 Second, the carefully considered plan-
ning process was proof that the City's stated purposes for the tak-
ing were not pretextual. 75 Third, it was the duty of the courts to
exercise deference to the decisions of the local legislatures in dis-
cerning public need.
76
In Kelo, the United States Supreme Court first acknowledged
the possibility that a taking might violate the Public Use Clause of
the Fifth Amendment where the stated reasons for the taking
were pretext to a purely private transfer. 77 To determine when a
pretextual taking had occurred, Justice Stevens offered a few
tests. 178 The first test was to examine whether the condemnation was made
pursuant to a carefully considered development plan.' 79 The second was to
examine whether "the identities of the private parties were not known when
168. Id. at 474-75.
169. Id. at 475.
170. Kelo, 45 U.S. at 490.
171. 348 U.S. at 26.
172. 467 U.S. at 229.
173. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480-82.
174. Id. at 474-75.
175. Id. at 484.
176. Id. at 488-89 ("When the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its means are not
irrational, our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings-no less
than debates over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation-are not to be car-
ried out in the federal courts." (citing Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242-243)). However, Justice
Stevens, noted that there was nothing prohibiting states from restricting the power of emi-
nent domain. IM. at 489.
177. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478. Specifically, Justice Stevens asserted that a city could not
"take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to
bestow a private benefit." Id. See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 61 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Prior
to Kelo, no Supreme Court decision had endorsed the notion of a 'pretext' claim .... ")
178. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478.
179. Id. at 478 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 536 (Conn. 2004)).
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the plan was adopted."' 8 0 The final test was to determine whether there
had been a one-to-one transfer of property executed outside the
confines of an integrated development plan. 8 '
Since Kelo, there has been a prevailing political consensus that
real limits should be placed on the taking power of the state.182 By
requiring strict adherence to the laws of eminent domain, the ma-
jority in Middletown enforced such limits and protected an inno-
cent landowner from a clearly abusive exercise of the power. For
this reason, the majority should be commended.
However, one vital question that follows Middletown is the ex-
tent of its impact on Pennsylvania courts and other governmental
bodies. Another critical question concerns whether the courts will
be able to provide similar justice in the future when more ad-
vanced pretextual takings occur. Finally, Justice Saylor and Jus-
tice Eakin raise questions in their concurring and dissenting opin-
ions concerning the proper scope and standard of review. It is im-
portant to address these concerns.
V. THE IMPACT OF MIDDLETOWN
To be clear, Middletown does not represent a sharp break from
Pennsylvania law. Still, it is a reflection of the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court's current mood regarding the government's strict
compliance with the rules of eminent domain. Consequently, the
decision should have some impact going forward. Essentially, the
majority in Middletown sends a strong signal to Pennsylvania
courts that they should be vigilant in ferreting out unlawful uses
of the power. 18 3 As a result, the lower courts should be more ag-
180. Id. at 478 n.6.
181. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487 (quoting 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment
Agency, 237 F.Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001)).
182. "The public outcry in the wake of [Kelo] was nothing short of hysterical. Articles
about eminent domain were abundant; indeed even Parade Magazine and Women's Wear
Daily ran articles about Suzette Kelo's plight. Thereafter, hundreds of bills that would
severely restrict the government's power of eminent domain were introduced in over 40
state legislatures, at least 17 of them in New York." 209 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE,
EMINENT DOMAIN - BEFORE AND AFTER KELO 320 (2007). In 2006, in response to the deci-
sion in Kelo, Pennsylvania's legislature signed into law the Property Rights Protection Act.
26 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 201-206 (2006). The primary purpose of the PRPA is revealed in
section 204(a), which prohibits "the exercise by any condemnor of the power of eminent
domain to take private property in order to use it for private enterprise."
183. Like so many of his other opinions, the decision in Middletown imposes a require-
ment on government entities to provide proof that they are acting within the statutory
confines of their power. However, Chief Justice Cappy followed his own example and took
great care in Middletown to ensure that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not exceed
673
Duquesne Law Review
gressive in overturning pretextual takings, such as the one seen in
Middletown.8 4 This type of hard line approach by the lower
courts will certainly be a positive outcome for landowners, who, as
a result of the increased scrutiny, should logically see a rise in the
number of overturned takings.
Middletown also serves as notice to government entities that
they must confine their takings to the power afforded them under
the law. Forcing the creation of a development plan, as was re-
quired by the majority in Middletown, insures that, when gov-
ernment entities take, they do in fact take for a statutorily-
permitted public purpose. To the extent that these entities re-
spond to Middletown by creating the appropriate plans, they lock
themselves into a predetermined use of the condemned property,
which can be tested by courts for compliance. Such an outcome
guarantees a public benefit to the extent that the eminent domain
laws begin to operate the way that they were intended. Like
many of Chief Justice Cappy's opinions, Middletown informs these
government entities that they can no longer pay lip service to the
requirements of the law, but must truly operate within its stated
boundaries.
Additionally, Middletown provides guidance for the lower courts
on the question of how much judicial deference should be given to
a legislative authority's stated purposes. 8 5 While it is universally
accepted that a court must show deference to the decisions of a
local legislature in discerning public need, 86 a case like Middle-
town shows that giving deference to a legislative authority does
not mean that a court must presume the government's explana-
tion for the purpose of a taking to be truthful. 8 7 This is evident in
the scope of its own judicial power. It was always a pleasure to see Chief Justice Cappy
lead by example.
184. These local legislative authorities hide behind the deference paid to legislative
bodies. Most courts treat the legislative authorization of a taking as raising the presump-
tion that a proper reason for the taking exists. This presumption shows up in many forms.
Most courts do not provide a single standard but instead "tend toward" a rational basis type
of review or else simply rely on the Berman proposition that a "legislature's judgment is
well-nigh conclusive." Laura Mansnerus, Public Use, Private Use, and Judicial Review in
Eminent Domain, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 409, 426 (1983).
185. Mansnerus, supra, note 184, at 427-28. Historically, U.S. courts have been unwill-
ing to closely scrutinize the legislative authorization of condemnations. Id. This is because
the courts extend a presumption of constitutionality to takings in eminent domain actions.
Id. Like most other kinds of legislative decisions, the court assumes that the government's
decision represents a true public consensus. Id.
186. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488-89.
187. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 338. As the Court wrote:
It cannot be sufficient to merely wave the properly statutory language like a scepter
under the nose of a property owner and demand that he forfeit his land for the sake
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Middletown where the majority refused to presume the validity of
the Township's stated purpose,188 and, instead, examined the find-
ings of the lower court in search of the true purpose. 89 In render-
ing its own conclusion, the majority gave little weight to the
Township's bald assertions. Instead, the majority searched for
independent evidence, such as a development plan, that would
demonstrate that the Township's asserted reasons were true.190
Where no such evidence existed, the majority overturned the trial
court's conclusion that the purpose behind the taking was recrea-
tional.19'
A. The Need for Further Judicial Reform
The majority in Middletown overturned an unlawful use of the
eminent domain power simply by relying on existing precedent.
This fact is significant because, for many years, scholars and
property rights activists have been calling for reform legislation
and a change in the current law. In Middletown, however, the
majority relied only on existing decisions such as Winger and Be-
lovsky to compel strict compliance and overturn the trial court's
legal conclusions that the Township's stated purposes were true.
192
Thus, Middletown demonstrates that just results can sometimes
be obtained without reform legislation or overturning the existing
law.
Still, further legislative intervention is necessary to protect
landowners in cases where the unlawful purposes are less obvious
than in Middletown. One such case is where the condemning au-
thority has created a comprehensive development plan in order to
conceal its unlawful purpose. As it stands in Pennsylvania, tak-
ings are consistently upheld when "orchestrated according to a
carefully developed plan which effectuates the stated purpose.' ' 93
of the public. Rather, there must be some substantial and rational proof by way of an
intelligent plan that demonstrates informed judgment to prove that an authorized
public purpose is the true goal of the taking.
Id.
188. Id. ("The record does not support any finding of a condemnation proceeding in-
formed by intelligent judgment or a concrete plan to use the Stone Farm for the authorized
purpose of recreation ....")
189. Id. ("This Court will leave undisturbed the factual findings made by the trial court.
But, as a matter of law, we conclude that these findings do not support the legal conclusion
that the true purpose of the taking was for recreational use.")
190. Id.
191. Id. at 340.




Thus, the only major hurdle to condemning land is the develop-
ment of a plan tailored to the stated public purpose. Furthermore,
after Middletown, the government is now on notice that Pennsyl-
vania courts will demand strict compliance. It is therefore
unlikely that many local authorities will fail to develop compre-
hensive plans in support of their exercise of the power.
This is especially true because, as recognized by Justice
O'Connor in her Kelo dissent, it is not difficult for a local legisla-
ture to simply state a lawful purpose and then create a corre-
sponding development plan as evidence that the stated purpose is
true. 194 In order to guard against this type of fabrication, a court
must be permitted to reject a development plan where the evi-
dence indicates that the plan is a disguise for unlawful purposes.
This is not to say that development plans do not serve a useful
purpose by compelling an outward expression of the reasons for a
taking, but only by allowing Pennsylvania courts to consider other
evidence outside of the plan itself will the courts be truly equipped
to root out and overturn pretextual takings masked within these
plans.
B. Justice Saylor's Concurrence and Justice Eakin's Dissent
Both Justice Saylor in his concurrence and Justice Eakin in his
dissent raised concerns over the majority's standard of review.
While the majority characterized their own standard of review of
the trial court's conclusion as an abuse of discretion, 195 Justice
Saylor's concurrence seemed to assert that the standard of review
was otherwise.1 96 Specifically, Justice Saylor stated that he did
not regard the majority's finding that the Township's taking was
for recreational purposes as a pure conclusion of law.197 This is a
bit surprising, however, considering that the majority also did not
consider their finding as a pure legal conclusion. To the contrary,
the majority stated that their standard of review had been abuse
of discretion.198 Had the majority considered their finding as a
194. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 502 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Whatever the details of Jus-
tice Kennedy's as-yet-undisclosed test, it is difficult to envision anyone but the 'stupid
staff[eri' failing it." (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025-26 n.12
(1992))).
195. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 338.
196. Id. at 340.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 335. "In our limited grant we asked whether the Commonwealth Court erred
in affirming the Court of Common Pleas in overruling the preliminary objections to the
declaration of taking. For this issue, our standard of review is abuse of discretion." Id.
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pure legal conclusion, then they would have certainly asserted a
de novo standard of review. Thus, it appears that Justice Saylor
mischaracterized the majority.
Still, the differences between the majority's decision and Justice
Saylor's concurrence are minuscule. Justice Saylor asserted that
the question before the Court should have been treated as a mixed
question of law and fact.199 That being the case, Justice Saylor
would have found the question to be, either, legally heavy, allow-
ing de novo review and agreeing with the majority's decision as he
characterized it, or, factually heavy, requiring an abuse of discre-
tion standard, at which point, he must have agreed with the ma-
jority's actual decision that the record did not support the legal
conclusion.
Justice Eakin raised concerns that the majority had misapplied
the abuse of discretion standard where it had substituted its own
conclusion concerning the purpose of the Township's taking for
that of the trial court. 200 Justice Eakin believed that the record
clearly supported the lower court's finding that the taking was for
recreational purposes and that the conclusion of the lower court
should have been left undisturbed. 20 1 He focused on two pieces of
evidence that he felt supported the conclusion: the first was two
witnesses who had testified to the use of the Stone Farm as a con-
tinuation for an adjacent park.20 2 The second was the fact that the
property was part of a long-term recreational plan. 20 3
While Justice Eakin accurately described some of the evidence,
there are other facts that serve to further explain why this evi-
dence was ultimately unreliable. It is true that board members
did testify that the Stone Farm was to be used in a recreational
manner to extend the driveway of a neighboring park that once
housed a Celebration of Lights festival. 20 4 However, even if the
trial court had accepted this testimony as true, a serious problem
would still remain where the taking of 175 acres of land greatly
exceeded the proposed use as a driveway extension. As noted by
the majority, private property must only be condemned to the ex-
tent necessary to fulfill a legitimate reason or else it is invalid.20 5
199. Id. at 340.
200. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 342.
201. Id. at 343.
202. Id. at 342.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 336.
205. Middletown, 939 A.2d at 336 (quoting Twp. of Cornplanter v. McGregor, 745 A.2d
725, 727 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000)).
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There is no doubt that 175 acres far exceeds the amount of land
needed to extend a driveway for a park. Considering that 1 acre
nearly fills an American football field, taking 175 acres to extend a
small driveway for a park with a now-defunct festival is absurdly
excessive and strong evidence that the remaining acreage is to be
put to other, unstated uses. Strangely, however, Justice Eakin
says nothing in his dissent about the excessiveness of the taking.
Justice Eakin also does not discuss the overwhelming evidence
contradicting the Township's claim that its long-term plan in-
cluded recreational uses for the Stone Farm. While the plan in-
corporated, both, open space and recreational goals, the acquisi-
tion of new property was only to be made for the purpose of space
preservation. 20 6 The plan also stated that only the existing parks
and facilities were to be used for recreation. 20 7 Thus, the plan had
clearly expressed the purpose for the taking of the Stone Farm as
preservation of open space. The Township's plan also discussed
the Stone Farm specifically, but only mentioned it as a property to
be obtained for its open space value.20 8 Recreational uses of the
farm were never mentioned. 20 9 Considering the glaring holes in
the record surrounding the intended use for the Stone Farm, it is
difficult to see how the majority could have upheld the conclusion
of the lower court without merely rubber-stamping the decision.
While neither Justice Saylor nor Justice Eakin go far enough to
defeat the well-reasoned opinion of the majority, both of their
opinions manifest a strong desire to adequately frame the stan-
dard of review thereby ensuring that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court operates within its proper sphere of power. This is the re-
curring theme of Middletown.
VI. CONCLUSION
No doubt, the fallout from Kelo has only begun. With legislative
reform all around,2 10 it is hopeful that overreaching local authori-
ties, such as Middletown Township, will be curtailed in the future.
Yet, despite these reforms, many questions will still fall into the
laps of the court system. It is hopeful that the example set by
206. Id. at 338-39.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 339.
209. Id.
210. Over 80% of the states have recently passed reform legislation imposing new limi-
tations on eminent domain. See Amnon Lehavi & Amir N. Licht, Eminent Domain, Inc.,
107 COLUM. L. REV.. 1704, 1706 (2007).
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Chief Justice Cappy and the majority in Middletown will be fol-
lowed by other Pennsylvania courts and that they too will foster
justice for landowners in the Commonwealth by demanding strict
compliance with the laws of eminent domain.
Jason J. Kelley

